Divided government and significant legislation: A History of Congress from 1789 to 2010 by Ansolabehere, Stephen et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
BU Open Access Articles BU Open Access Articles
2018-03-01
Divided government and significant
legislation: A History of Congress
from 1789 to 2010
This work was made openly accessible by BU Faculty. Please share how this access benefits you.
Your story matters.
Version
Citation (published version): Stephen Ansolabehere, Maxwell Palmer, Benjamin Schneer. 2018.
"Divided Government and Significant Legislation: A History of
Congress from 1789 to 2010." Social Science History, Volume 42,
Issue 1, pp. 81 - 108 (28).
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/28920
Boston University
We would like to thank Josh Clinton and students in the spring 2013 section of GOV 1300. 
Divided Government and Significant 
Legislation, A History of Congress from 1789-2010 
 





This paper presents and analyzes the most comprehensive database to date of significant 
acts of Congress—from 1789–2010—in order to test whether divided party control of 
government affects the number of important acts Congress passes. We find that unified control 
corresponds with 1 additional significant act passed per Congress in the 19th Century and 4 
additional such acts in the 20th Century. However, party control of government cannot explain 
the broad historical trends in the rate at which Congress passes significant legislation. Nixon in 
1969 was far more successful with a Democratic Congress than was McKinley in 1897 with a 
Republican one.  






 1 Introduction  
Political parties are essential for American democracy. They provide structure to 
legislative politics and prevent chaos from stalling legislation (Rohde 1991, Aldrich 1995). They 
simplify the choices voters face, make informed electoral decisions possible (Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998) and solve collective action problems (Downs 1957). There is the growing 
concern, however, that the political parties in the American system of government may hamper 
the ability of government to act, especially when the control of government is divided between 
two highly polarized parties (Fiorina 1996, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006, Mann and 
Ornstein 2013). Silbey (1996) notes that “divided government stands out in the record for its 
persistent quality, its importance in [...] political affairs, and its acceptance as a fact of political 
life.” How much do the divisions between the parties and the prospect of divided partisan control 
of government contribute to the ability of government to pass legislation?  
Over the past two decades, a central debate in the study of American politics is whether 
unified party control is, in fact, more productive than divided government. Mark Peterson’s 
Legislating Together (1990) provides one of the first such investigations. He finds that party 
control of government, without controlling for other factors, does have a substantial effect on the 
number of laws passed from Truman through Reagan. The signal work in this vein of research, 
though, is David Mayhew’s Divided We Govern. In that book, Mayhew develops a classification 
of significant acts of Congress throughout the post-War era and concludes, somewhat 
surprisingly, that periods of unified party control of government do not correspond to higher 
levels of significant legislative accomplishment (Mayhew 1991). Subsequent research has built 
on and critiqued Mayhew’s classification of significant legislation and re-examined this question 
using alternative measures and methodologies (Kelly 1993, Howell, Adler, Cameron and 
Riemann 2000, Clinton and Lapinski 2006, Grant and Kelly 2008, Lapinski 2013).1 This 
intriguing approach faces its own complications if the data are not standardized and different 
databases are on different metrics and scales. Some authors have tried to redefine the problem, 
arguing that significant legislation is not the right measure of what Congress accomplishes, that 
different issue areas have different dynamics (Lapinski 2013), that legislation is a response to 
problems and significance can only be measured against a baseline of what problems face the 
country (Binder 1999), or that divided control is about blocking not passing legislation and that 
failure rates are a better measure (Edwards III, Barrett and Peake 1997). All of these refinements 
present important observations about the nature and meaning of legislation. Ultimately, though, 
the literature dissipates into ambiguity, with some authors finding substantial effects of divided 
control and others no difference between unified and divided control.  
The challenge presented by Mayhew’s simple observation remains. It appears that 
divided control is just as productive as unified control, measured as total bills passed or 
significant bills passed (regardless of domain). We think the problem is not measurement but 
time. We argue that Mayhew’s approach is perfectly valid, but the slice of time is too short and 
the data too sparse to answer the questions posed. Peterson and Mayhew both focus on the five 
decades from 1946 to 1991. This era has 22 different Congresses, 9 of which are unified and 13 
of which are divided. The limited time frame makes inference difficult, especially since the mid-
																																																						
1 Clinton and Lapinski (2006) and Grant and Kelly (2008) combines multiple summary measures 
of aggregate legislative productivity to measure productivity.  
1960s appear to be unusually productive and perhaps historically unusual. Nearly all other 
research in this literature focuses on the same era. Clinton and Lapinski (2006) is an exception. 
Clinton and Lapinski (2006) studies the period 1877–1994 using an item response model to 
assess legislative accomplishment based on a range of other rankings.2 The contribution of our 
paper is to examine whether Mayhew’s conclusions—based on data post-1946—are universal 
throughout U.S. history, using his method to define significant legislation. To this end, we follow 
the methodology developed by Mayhew, and construct a new dataset of significant legislation for 
the entire history of the U.S. Congress. We have constructed the database independently from 
Mayhew’s efforts, but we have endeavored to apply the same principles and methodology. As an 
additional check and for purposes of validation, we compare our dataset to other databases of 
significant legislation.  
To our knowledge, Stathis (2014) represents the only other comprehensive direct attempt 
to develop a list of significant legislation for the entire history of Congress. Stathis has compiled 
a catalog of significant legislation, organized by Congress and also indexed by topic. We use 
Stathis’ data as a complement to the database we assembled and as a robustness check.  
Looking at the entire span of U.S. history, we address two somewhat different questions. 
First, does divided government have a significant effect on the ability of the national government 
to pass legislation? This debate has taken on an even larger cast in the discussion among theorists 
of American governmental institutions over whether parties can capture government (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, Cox and McCubbins 2005, Rohde 1991, Aldrich 1995) or whether the median 
voter (or, perhaps, the filibuster pivot) remains the pivotal player in the legislative domain 
																																																						
2 The rankings used include Mayhew’s along with an impressive range of other 
contemporaneous and retrospective sources. 
(Brady and Volden 1998, Krehbiel 1998). Second, do parties and party control of government 
offer a substantial explanation of what Congress does and when it does it? Do party-based 
explanations account for the historical variation in legislative productivity?  
While this paper focuses on answering the first of these questions, our newly assembled 
data also allows for insights into the second question, as well. We estimate the effect of unified 
and divided control of government on the passage of legislation and of significant legislation 
throughout the history of the United States Congress—and we assess the stability of this effect in 
different historical periods.3 
The long time horizon allows us to see the effects of divided government more clearly. 
We find that under divided control of government Congress passes fewer pieces of significant 
legislation enacted into law — 1 fewer law per Congress in the 19th Century and 4 fewer laws 
per Congress in the 20th Century. These differences are statistically distinguishable from zero, 
indicating that unified party control does contribute to legislative accomplishment. However, the 
incidence of unified and divided control of government throughout the long history of the United 
States cannot explain the overall historical trends in the passage of historical legislation. Divided 
party control of government is more prevalent in the second half of the 20th Century than 
throughout the 19th Century, but much more significant legislation is passed under divided 
control of government in the 20th Century than was passed under unified control of government 
in the 19th Century.  
Other studies have tweaked the definitions or measurement techniques for “significant” 
																																																						
3 By effect we mean simple effect, that is the difference in the conditional mean between unified 
and divided control, rather than a causal effect per se. The effect we estimate may or may not be 
causal. Whether it is causal is not our immediate concern, nor is it the question in the literature. 
legislation. Howell et al. (2000) divides significant legislation into four different classes: 
landmark enactments (which correspond to a subset of Mayhew’s significant legislation—acts 
judged significant by contemporaneous sources), major enactments, ordinary enactments, and 
minor enactments. Based on these criteria and some technical adjustments to the estimation 
procedure, the authors find that divided government is associated with a 30% reduction in 
landmark legislation. Similarly, Kelly (1993) argues that the distinction between 
contemporaneously and retrospectively judged legislation is crucial. Revising the list of 
significant legislation restores the expected negative effect of divided government.  
Another threat to the validity of Mayhew’s assertion—and to much of the follow-up 
work—is that other important explanatory variables have been omitted. Coleman (1999) 
accounts for several institutional features thought to mediate the influence of unified/divided 
control such as which party is in control, whether a supermajority exists in the Senate, 
factionalism within parties, and public mood. Across several different measures of legislative 
productivity, Coleman finds that on balance unified government does play a role when 
accounting for important institutional features.4 Other work in the same vein has examined the 
role of ideological coalitions cutting across parties (Frymer 1994) and ideological cohesion 
(Taylor 1998).  
Divided government could also influence the character of legislation while not altering 
the total output of important legislation. Members of Congress might not enact as much 
																																																						
4 However, the robustness of these findings is constrained by the combination of the limited time 
period under consideration (the paper’s focus on the post World War II era results limits the data 
to under 25 observations) and the sizable list of covariates. 
“partisan” legislation, essentially deviating from their ideal points in order to facilitate coalition 
building so that the legislation will pass (Thorson 1998). Put another way, the legislation passed 
might shift to less “conflictual” policy areas (Bowling and Ferguson 2001). In addition, a trend 
towards more omnibus legislation might render simple counts of significant legislation 
incomparable across eras (Taylor 1998).  
The difficulty of determining what is significant legislation may also obscure assessments 
of how partisan control influences what gets done. Divided government appears to result in 
increases in congressional investigations (Kriner and Schwartz 2008, Parker and Dull 2009), 
more protectionist trade policies (Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994, Epstein and O’Halloran 1996), 
and an uptick in placing on the agenda controversial issues that might harm an opposing party 
president (Rose 2001). According to these studies, even if we cannot observe a large effect of 
divided government on significant legislation, other aspects related to legislative productivity 
may be hurt by partisan divisions.  
There is also not necessarily a consensus about the implications of reduced legislative 
productivity, if it does in fact result from divided partisan control. It could be that the electorate 
actually prefers divided government, and rationally splits votes between candidates of competing 
parties in order to ensure maintenance of the status quo (Fiorina 1996). In this telling, citizens are 
less concerned with seeking out positive reforms and rather prefer to limit government action. Or 
perhaps voters evaluate Presidential candidates differently than members of Congress, and are 
willing to vote for a Presidential candidate they disagree with on some issues because they know 
that opposing members of Congress will constrain his or her actions (Jacobson 1990).  
Our contribution with this paper is to introduce a new, independent dataset on all 
legislation and significant legislation in order to better assess the various claims made in the 
partisan control literature. The database presented here covers all Congresses, which allows for 
better estimation of the effects of party control on legislative productivity, both because there are 
more data points from 1790 to 2013 than from 1947 to 2013 and because the effect may not be 
constant across historical eras. The broad sweep of history reveals that Mayhew’s assessment is 
ultimately right in questioning whether party control can explain what Congress does because 
long-term trends in party control are at odds with long-term trends in the number and 
significance of Congressional enactments. Critics of Mayhew’s original conclusion that unified 
party control has statistically insignificant effects on significant legislation may be right on that 
narrow question, but upon reconsideration of the evidence a larger problem for the party-control 
theory emerges. Unified and divided party control cannot explain the broad patterns of 
legislation in American history, especially the gross differences between the 19th Century and 
the 20th Century, or even between the first half of the 20th Century and the decades since World 
War II.  
2 Data  
Evaluating the effects of party control for the full history of Congress presented a number 
of challenges. To guide our efforts, we assembled our dataset using a simple definition of 
significant legislation based on meeting one of two criteria. First, is the bill important in 
historical context? When we look back on the legislation from our current perspective, did this 
bill accomplish something important, such as establish a major governmental agency, introduce a 
major policy change, declare war, or pass a constitutional amendment? Second, was the bill 
viewed as an important legislative accomplishment in its own time? This type of bill is harder to 
identify, and requires histories or the Congressional Record to determine its importance. For 
example, some slavery related bills that preceded the Civil War did not have long-lasting 
significance due to the abolition of slavery, but they were major legislative accomplishments 
addressing the critical issue of their time. In making these assessments, we relied on historical 
treatments of the Congress and politics of the time period, such as the Ante-Bellum period, the 
New Deal, and so forth. For our data collection sources, see Appendix B.5  
Our final database includes 1,040 significant bills that Congress enacted into law.6 We 
also use counts of total public and private bills passed in each Congress. For the Congresses 
between 1789 and 1976 we used Appendix F of Galloway and Wise (1976), and for the 
remaining years we used counts from the Library of Congress.  
While our dataset was collected in a similar manner to Mayhew (1991), our dataset does 
not contain the exact same significant legislation for the overlapping period. There are some bills 
in our data that Mayhew did not include, and others that Mayhew included that we did not code 
as significant. For example, Mayhew’s dataset excluded the 23rd Amendment, which was passed 
by the 87th Congress and granted Washington, D.C. votes in the electoral college.  
Figure 1a plots the number of significant bills by Congress in our dataset and the datasets 
utilized in Mayhew (1991) and Howell et al. (2000) from the 79th Congress to the 104th 
Congress. The figure shows that our data roughly corresponds to these other data sets. The 
Howell et al. data was created by supplementing the Mayhew data with additional legislation. 
Therefore, the Howell et al. counts of significant legislation are always higher than the Mayhew 
counts. For a majority of the Congresses, our data falls in-between these two datasets. As an 
																																																						
5	For further description on the process of assembling the data set, see Ansolabehere, Palmer and 
Schneer (2016). 
6 This excludes major legislation that failed and was vetoed and not overridden, judicial 
nominations, and treaties. 
additional validation test for our data collection before 1945, Figure 1b compares our data to 
counts of significant legislation from Stathis (2014).7 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
3 Trends in Legislative Action  
When the members of the First Congress convened in 1789, there were no national laws 
governing the budget, economy, citizenship, federal crimes, or many other domains that today 
we take as given. The Constitution had left large portions of the federal government undefined, 
especially the President’s cabinet and the organization of the judiciary. Against that background, 
it was, perhaps, unavoidable that the First Congress would enact some of the most significant 
legislation in the nation’s history. Without federal legislation to enable the functioning of the 
judiciary and executive, the new constitution would likely have failed. The First Congress and 
the Second Congress, which continued the essential work of implementing the Constitution, were 
clearly exceptional.  We are concerned with more mundane times.  Over the two centuries since 
the Founding, what explains when Congress does and does not act?  
The central claim of David Mayhew’s Divided We Govern and the subsequent literature 
is that the partisan organization of Congress and the Presidency explains a substantial portion of 
the variation in when Congress acts and when it does not.  This article tests that claim using the 
time series of legislation and significant legislation from the Founding to the present.  In this 
section, we describe the time trends in total legislation and significant legislation over the entire 
																																																						
7 In almost all Congresses Stathis (2014) codes more legislation as significant than in our dataset. 
This is partially due to the inclusion of major treaties, which we exclude, as well as to different 
criteria for determining significance. 
history of the United States Congress.   
Before describing the ebbs and flows of legislative activity, a detour is in order 
concerning the changing nature of legislation.  Nearly all work on Congress and legislation treats 
bills as the same thing over time.  A bill in 1790 is the same as a bill in 2010.  Reading through 
the historical record of the United States Congress it is clear that the nature of legislation has 
evolved substantially since the First Congress.   
The first bill introduced into the new Congress in 1789 was an act to levy fees on the 
tonnage of ships, introduced by Mr. Adams of Massachusetts.  The resolution simply lists 
various types of vessels on which tonnage fees were to be charged, but actual fees are left as 
blanks to be filled in later.  The bill has no number and no title, no reference to existing code, no 
definition of terms, no reference to the implementing or enforcing government agency, no time 
frame, no means of implementation, and no reference to other, potentially conflicting legislation 
— none of the trappings of a modern bill.  For the first several Congresses that was standard.  
Bills and statutes had yet to be rationalized. 
 The early Congresses also often proceeded in an ad hoc manner.  There was no budget 
act and there were no appropriation acts; there was no budget process.  Appropriations were 
made piecemeal, in response to individual requests for funds.  The minutes of the early 
Congresses are littered with requests to fund construction of lighthouses or post roads in specific 
locations or the removal of snags from various rivers or to compensate individuals who were 
surveying western lands.  These various activities, taken together, are important; they represent 
the Congress at work building a nation, one project at a time.  Viewed through the lenses of 
“significant legislation,” these various activities do not rise constitute Congress taking singular 
and sweeping actions that set policy and to create long-lived or transformative statutes.   
Legislation itself has changed considerably from the early Republic to the modern era.  
Over the past two centuries Congress has systematically rationalized the legislative process.  
Bills now follow a formula and have a legalistic and bureaucratic aspect. Congress has 
developed a language and code that defines the legal apparatus to define and constrain the 
executive branch.  In the 1820s, Congress developed omnibus bills as a way of combining many 
specific requests.  After its first half century, in 1849, the U.S. House decided to create a 
permanent standing committee on Rules to manage how legislation is brought to the floor.  And, 
during the Civil War the modern approach to budgeting emerged, separating appropriation from 
taxation and developing subcommittees to deal with specific areas of the government.   
Perhaps the clearest example of the rationalization of legislation is the treatment of 
private bills. Throughout the 19th Century, Congress used private legislation to pay for military 
pensions, benefits for military widows, compensation for property, and a variety of other 
particular transactions (Skocpol 1993, Skocpol 1995).  Private acts are distinct from public acts.  
Public acts take the form of statutes, judicial and executive appointments, approval of treaties, 
and other actions that have the standing of public laws.  The number of such transactions grew 
exponentially over the decades following the Civil War, and Congress eventually decided to 
create a pension law to get the thousands of requests for relief off of the legislature’s agenda.  
Private legislation continued into the 21st century, but it became extraordinarily rare.  The end of 
the era of private legislation mark the end of one style of legislating and the emergence of the 
form of legislation to which we are accustomed today; it is the transition from specialized and 
specific actions to general policy. 
The growing rationalization of legislation likely affected the productivity of Congress.  
Each time that Congress moves to rationalize a legislative arena, such as appropriations or 
pensions or the creation of committee systems, it frees up time for the entire legislature to 
address other matters. Hence, it may be the case that the growing rationalization of the legislative 
process itself creates the capacity — but not the need — to create more legislation in the future. 
This paper gauges the amount of legislation Congress produces, and its significance.  
Also evolving and changing is the content of legislation.  We do not track that change here, but 
there are notable shifts that occur with the changing nature of the nation.  Throughout the 19th 
Century Congress is centrally concerned with the territory and expansion of the United States, 
including the admission of states and the management of territories.  And, throughout the 19th 
Century, the United States’ relationship with native American tribes is a major activity of the 
Congress, including treaties, wars, and mass relocations of people.  As the country changed so 
too did the content of legislation.  We assume that those changes in content do not drive the 
changes in the format and significance of individual pieces of legislation.   
The changing nature of legislation is not reflected in our measures of total and significant 
acts.  It is worth flagging how the changed nature of legislation might affect the picture of 
various trends. A law that creates a comprehensive approach to such private legislation becomes 
a significant act, but the many private bills leading up to it are not. The many ad hoc 
appropriation bills in the first half of the 19th century do not rise to the level of significance, but 
the budget acts that rationalize the process do.  This approach follows how prior scholarship has 
treated the history of legislation.  Scholars refer to public acts when studying what explains what 
Congress does.  And significance is often viewed through the lenses of today.  We have 
attempted to consult historical documents of the time or of earlier scholars in identifying when 
Congress passes significant legislation. 
Figure 2a presents the number of Public Acts passed by each Congress from 1789 to 
2010. Each Congress is noted by its number. This is simply the total number of acts passed and 
does not depend on classifications of significance.The patterns in Figure 2a help us put prior 
work on the study of divided government in context. To begin with, Mayhew’s path breaking 
study began with the 78th Congress (the post World War II era).  The 78th Congress passed 
approximately 600 acts. The next 20 years saw a precipitous growth in legislative action, peaking 
with the Great Society Congresses (the 84th and 85th Congresses) — each of which produced 
over 1,000 acts.  The era from World War II to the Great Society was unusually active. Since 
1966, there has been a steady decline in total legislation passed, and the number of public acts 
passed today is less than half the number passed in the peak years of the late 1950s and early 
1960s.   
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Today, there has been much written about the institutional paralysis brought on by a 
surge in partisan polarization. The trends in Figure 2 suggest a more measured interpretation.  
The low number of bills passed in the 111th and 112th Congresses are predictable forecasts from 
the steady trend downward in number of laws passed since the 1960s.  
Figure 2 also reveals that the post-World War II period differs markedly from what had 
come before.  There are clearly four eras of congressional history, in terms of total legislative 
output.  The first is the Ante-Bellum period (1789 to 1861).  A typical Congress passed only 150 
public acts. Despite their obvious importance, the first two Congresses were not that productive 
in total numbers of bills passed.  And, the 26th Congress earns the title of the Do Nothing 
Congress, which managed to pass only a few dozen public acts.  The second era is the Industrial 
period (from 1862 to 1925), roughly the Civil War through the end of World War I (1862 to 
1925).  Throughout this time there was a steady rise in the number of public acts from 200 to 500 
acts per Congress. This is an era of rapid industrialization in the nation and, interestingly, 
corresponds almost exactly to the period that Skowronek identifies as the era of the development 
of the American national executive (Skowronek 1982).  The third era is the New Deal, which 
begins before FDR’s election and extends to the Great Society.  Some scholars term this the 
Modern Era in Congress.  The number of laws passed by Congress jumped in 1927-29 and stays 
at that very high level of productivity from 1927 through 1966.  This era also coincides with the 
rise of the conservative coalition and the partisan realignment that leads to the ascendancy of the 
Democratic Party nationally.  The fourth era, the Post-Modern Congress, begins in 1967.  The 
1966 midterm elections marked the beginning of a turn in American politics, which ultimately 
brought the rise of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.  Legislative activity drops substantially 
from 1965-66 to 1967-68 and has continued to trend downward since.  Aldrich and Niemi (1996) 
characterize this as a protracted period of partisan dealignment, rising incumbency advantages 
and campaign expenditures, and growing public dissatisfaction with Congress. Legislative output 
declined steadily from 1967 to 2015.  There was much hand-wringing about the number of bills 
considered and passed in the 112th Congress.  Mann and Ornstein (2012) blame the declining 
productivity on “the new politics of extremism,” which cause gridlock in the American 
constitutional system.  Figure 2 puts those concerns in historical context.  The levels of 
productivity that we see today are back to the levels associated with the period from 1870 
through 1920, and extend the downward trend that started in 1967.  
The arc of Congressional history raises numerous questions.  There is a great rise in 
legislation over the first 150 years of Congress and then a 50 year decline in output.  Why the 
rise and decline?  Spikes in legislative activity do not coincide with electoral realignments or 
policy realignments.  The most productive Congresses are the 70th (1927-29) and 84th (1959-
61), not, as we might have guessed, the 73rd (1933-35) or 89th (1965-67).  And, Reagan’s first 
congress — the 97th from 1981 to 1983 — is remarkably unproductive.  Why the jump in 
legislative activity in the 1920s, before the New Deal, and in 1960, before the Great Society?  
We are also struck by the tremendous differences between the 19th and 20th Centuries.  
The first two Congresses set the stage for the development of the American state, but it took a 
full century before Congress got into the swing of legislating what we might consider today to be 
public policy.  Why is the 19th Century “policy free”?   
The history of significant legislation adds to the richness of the picture and tells a subtly 
different story about Congress. Figure 2b presents the history of Significant Acts passed by 
Congress. Each point in the plot is a Congress. This graph consists of all public acts determined 
by our project to be significant acts of Congress.  
As with total legislation, there is a marked difference between the 19th and 20th Centuries. 
The 19th Century produced much less significant legislation than the 20th Century. The amount 
of significant legislation passed by a typical Congress rises from the end of the 19th Century 
through the middle of the 20th Century, peaks in the 1960s and then steadily declines. Today the 
number of significant acts passed by a typical Congress is now back to the levels typical of the 
end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th Centuries (Congresses 55, 56, and 57), but still above 
the historical average.  
Total legislation and significant legislation have very different peaks. The First and 
Second Congresses stand above the rest of the 19th Century in terms of number of pieces of 
significant legislation passed.  From then to the New Deal, three other spikes occur — the first 
Civil War Congress (the 36th, 1859-61), the 51st Congress (1889-91), and the First World War 
Congress (the 65th, 1917-19).  Two of these spikes correspond to major war efforts.  The other, 
the 51st, is more curious.  It is the first term of Harrison’s presidency, which historians do not 
describe as a notable presidency.  But it is also the first two years of Thomas Brackett Reed’s 
speakership, and the beginning of the transformation of political power within Congress.  The 
20th Century spikes correspond to significant policy realignments. There are tremendous jumps 
in the numbers of significant acts with the advent of the New Deal (the 73rd, 74th, and 75th 
Congresses) and the creation of the Great Society programs (the 87th, 88th, and 89th 
Congresses). In these two eras Congress passed very large numbers of acts that had long-lasting 
significance to the nation.  
There is another way to understand the incidence of significant legislation, and that is as a 
percent of total legislative output. One simple story is that no Congress is particularly special in 
its ability to produce significant legislation, but that the more legislation a Congress passes the 
more likely it is to pass significant legislation. This is perhaps the “dartboard theory of 
Congress.” The more darts one throws the more likely one is to hit a bullseye. Figure 2c presents 
this alternative view of the history of Congressional legislative output. We simply took the ratio 
of Significant Acts to Total Public Acts for each Congress. We view this ratio as a measure of 
the Effectiveness of Congressional Action.  
Viewed from this perspective the Ante Bellum Congresses are exceptional. The First and 
Second Congresses were, by far, the most effective legislative sessions in our history. One in six 
acts passed by the First Congress were deemed significant, and one in four acts passed by the 
Second Congress were determined to be significant. For that reason alone, they deserve special 
attention. But the rest of the Ante Bellum era also appears to have been unusually effective. The 
7th Congress (1801 to 1803), the 17th and 18th (1821-1825), and the 36th (1859 to 1869) had 
unusually high percentages of significant acts. These Congresses dealt with the expansion of the 
nation (especially the admission of states), reorganizations of the executive, and the recurring 
problems of Slavery and Indian relations. The problems pressing on the country, then, meant that 
they seem bound to pass significant legislation. But this is also an era in which Congress, on 
occasion, ground to a complete stand still, as with the 13th, 26th, and 38th Congresses. The 
significance of these early Congresses, though, points to a weakness with prior inquiries. Much 
happened before 1946 or 1877 that ought to inform how we think about what Congress does and 
when it does it.  
Setting aside the pre-Civil War Congresses, no clear pattern emerges. From the 37th to 
the 112th Congress, the percent of legislation that one might consider significant hovers around 2 
to 3 percent of all acts passed. Even the 73rd, 87th, and 88th Congresses show a very low level 
of effectiveness. In all three cases, less than 5 percent of all legislation was considered 
significant. There does, however, appear to be a slight difference between the pre-New Deal and 
the post-New Deal Congresses. The rate at which Congress passes significant legislation is 
slightly higher since the New Deal, but that difference is slight.  The percent of legislation that is 
considered significant, then, appears to be a fairly constant percent of all acts. 
The patterns in Figures 2a to 2c provide us some confidence in the coding of significant 
legislation. Figure 2c demonstrates that our database of significant legislation does not suffer 
from “recency bias.”  In percentage terms, bills from the 19th century are no less likely to be 
considered significant than bills from more recent times.  There is simply a greater volume of 
legislation in the 20th and 21st Centuries, and that drives the number of significant bills. 
One interpretation of the patterns in Figures 1 and 2 is that the history of Congress in one 
of increasing organizational capacity for doing its most basic task, passing laws.  Improvements 
in procedures, staffing, technology, and so on, have all improved the efficiency of the 
organization and the ability to get things done.  Even when Congress appears divided and 
dysfunctional today it still has a much greater ability to deal with legislation, and it can function 
today with much greater ease than it has in the past.  That is true of legislation generally.   
Significant legislative actions are rare.   They occur infrequently, but every Congress in 
modern history makes its mark.  The frequency of significant legislation has also been driven by 
the increased organizational capacity of Congress.  Just as Congress is able to do more thanks to 
procedures, people, and technology, so to is it better able today to take significant actions and 
make sweeping legal changes.  Around those generally upward trends in legislation and 
significant legislation are some very notable variations in legislative activity. 
The time trends examined here lay the groundwork for the second part of this paper, 
understanding why Congress passes more and more significant laws at some times in our history 
than it does at other times.  One of the central conjectures of modern Political Science is that 
partisan control of the branches of government shapes the ability of Congress to get things done.  
Specifically, it is widely argued that unified partisan control of the government creates a much 
larger opportunity to change the laws of the land than does divided party control of the 
government.  When the same party has majorities in the House and Senate and controls the 
White House, the policy differences among the branches of government are thought to be much 
smaller, and the possibilities for reaching agreement in negotiations over changes in laws are 
thought to be much greater.  Such opportunities, of course, can be squandered by political 
leaders, and there may be moments when events bring politicians to act together (e.g., the first 
Gulf War in 1991) in spite of partisan differences.  Such moments, however, are thought to be 
unusual; in the normal course of politics, unified partisan control of government, as David 
Mayhew conjectured in Divided We Govern, creates the necessary conditions for significant 
changes in public laws. 
In the next section we use the variation in the passage of significant legislation and 
legislation overall to gauge how much unified or divided partisan control of government 
contributes to Congressional productivity.  
Two caveats are in order.  First, the argument is not that unified partisan control is 
everything.  Congress accomplishes quite a lot when politics are divided. The 91st and 100th 
Congresses—both divided—passed as many significant laws as the 73rd.  But on the margin 
there does seem to be a relationship. The First and Second (unified) are more productive than the 
Third and Fourth (divided), and so forth.  Rather, we aim to measure how much additionally 
Congress gets done when the same party controls the House, the Senate, and the Presidency.   
Second, the value in looking at the entire history of Congress is that it gives us added 
perspective on our own time.  Today, the debate that is raging among political commentators and 
Political Scientists concerns the destructive nature of partisan polarization.  There is tantalizing 
evidence in the historical time series that partisan polarization and legislative productivity are 
related.  The rise in productivity in Congress in Figures 1 and 2 corresponds quite closely with 
the decline in polarization in the House and Senate, and especially with the percent of legislators 
from each party who are “overlapping” — that is Democrats to the right of at least one 
Republican and Republicans who are to the left of at least one Democrat. In particular, Poole and 
Rosenthal (1997) identify the 70th Congress (1927-29) as the beginning of a substantial decline 
in polarization within the Congress and after the 90th Congress polarization gradually increases. 
This era from 1927 to 1973 is often looked back on as the standard for how Congress ought to 
behave by commentators such as Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein (2013), and it does appear 
that broad historical fluctuations in polarization correspond with broad ebbs and flows in the tide 
of significant legislation.  But, what is causing what?  Both the measure of polarization and the 
measure of legislative activity concern the same outcome — legislative decision making.  These 
two factors are so closely tied to each other that it seems unlikely that there is a clean causal 
account.  It may be that when politics are less divided Congress can get more things done.  It 
seems just as plausible that when legislators decide to get a lot done party becomes a lot less 
important. 
4 Effects of Divided Government  
How does divided government influence legislative output? Examining the full span of 
the history of Congress, divided government has produced 8.12 significant bills per Congress on 
average; in contrast, unified governments averaged 8.66 significant bills.8 For this simple 
comparison of means, performing a hypothesis test with a null hypothesis of no difference in 
legislative productivity for unified versus divided government does not allow us to reject the null 
at standard significance levels. Furthermore, when examining total legislation (see Table 1), 
																																																						
8 Determining whether Congress was operating under unified or divided partisan control was 
generally a straightforward endeavor; the one instance in which we had to employ our own best 
judgment was for the 20th Congress. In this case, John Quincy Adams served as President as a 
Democratic-Republican, and the partisan composition of Congress was in flux as the Jacksonians 
and Whigs were beginning to emerge and differentiate themselves from Democratic-
Republicans. We ultimately labeled the 20th Congress as under unified partisan control. 
Nonetheless, the opposite coding does not change our findings. 
divided government corresponded to a slightly higher level of legislation than unified 
government, with a total of 414.16 pieces of legislation under divided control versus 411.88 
under unified control. These initial results do not provide strong support for Mayhew’s 
conjecture, but importantly they neither control for important variation in the levels of legislation 
for different historical eras of Congress, nor do they account for time trends in legislative 
productivity  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To begin to account for these possibilities, we examine legislative productivity in four 
distinct eras: pre- Civil War (1st-36th Congress), post-Civil War but before the turn of the 
century (37th-55th Congress), post-1900 to the conclusion of World War II (56th-79th 
Congress), and post-World War II (80th - 111th Congress).9  While the size of the differences 
vary across eras, in each case unified partisan control produces a higher level of significant 
legislation. The largest raw increase in legislative productivity occurred in the post-World War II 
era: unified partisan control led to five more significant acts per Congress than divided partisan 
control, amounting to a 40% gain. The post-Civil War period also registered a large increase in 
legislative productivity under unified government, with a raw increase of 2.6 significant acts per 
congress, or roughly a 60% increase. In the pre-Civil War era, unified partisan control registered 
5.64 significant acts per Congress versus 5 significant acts under divided partisan control (under 
a 10% jump). Finally, for the period post-1900 to the end of World War II, the difference 
narrows further to just 0.55 bills per Congress. Turning to total legislation, the results mostly 
																																																						
9 Our choice of eras is based on beliefs about structural breaks in the history of the United States. 
For details on a more principled approach to determining structural breaks in politics and history 
see Wawro and Katznelson (2014). 
track with the pattern observed for significant legislation. The one exception is the post-World 
War II era, when divided control yielded higher total legislation per Congress than unified 
government. Breaking out legislative output by era also reveals a general upward time trend for 
both total legislation and significant legislation, with the upward trend being more pronounced 
for total legislation.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
While examining mean legislative output per Congress by era reveals a gap in 
productivity between unified and divided governments, this approach does not fully control for 
some crucial factors that may influence legislative output. Table 2 reveals substantial increases in 
the level of significant legislation over time. That is, as time passes, Congress has grown more 
productive under both divided and unified government. As a result, we must explicitly account 
for time trends in legislative output, which we do in several ways. First, we estimate ordinary 
least squares regressions of legislative productivity on unified government and include indicator 
variables for each era of Congress. Second, we include an alternative specification that uses first 
differences to remove time trends from the data, allowing us to focus on how legislative 
productivity changed from Congress to Congress after changes in partisan control.   
Another concern not addressed by a simple comparison of means is that context can 
change systematically from one presidential administration to another. Comparing legislative 
output across presidential administrations may overlook the fact that the effectiveness of a 
President’s administration could itself play a role in legislative output, while also influencing the 
partisan composition of government. For example, the legislative effectiveness of a first-term 
President influences their odds of winning a second term and, through partisan tides, the odds of 
winning for co-partisan members of Congress.  Thus, a successful president might be responsible 
for high levels of legislative productivity and, due to this success, also be responsible for unified 
partisan control. This scenario might lead us to attribute changes in legislative productivity to 
partisan control when in fact the causation runs in the opposite direction. By including a fixed 
effect for each President, we can examine how party control affects legislative productivity 
within a President’s term, thereby ruling out differences due to different administrations.  
We report OLS estimates of the effect of unified government on legislative productivity 
in Table 3. We find that unified government is associated with between 2.41 and 3.06 additional 
significant acts (as compared to divided government). This result obtains when we include era 
dummy variables as well as when we include President fixed effects. The effect sizes are 
substantively large. Congress has averaged fewer than 9 significant pieces of legislation under 
divided control, so the increase in productivity under unified partisan control amounts to an 
increase of more than one-third. In fact, if we log-transform legislative output and re-estimate the 
model, unified government is associated with an even larger percentage increase in significant 
legislation for our preferred specification: Table C1 in the Appendix suggests that instances of 
unified control, when compared to divided control in the same presidential administration, 
coincided with an increase in significant legislation of 38%. Conversely, we do not find 
consistent evidence that unified government affects total legislation (Models 1-4).  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Including the period dummy variables plays an important role in the estimation of unified 
government’s effect on significant legislation, especially with regard to legislative output since 
the end of World War II. Before the 80th Congress, there were 24 cases of divided government 
and 55 cases of unified government. After the 80th Congress the numbers were more equal with 
18 cases of divided government and 14 cases of unified government. The fact that there have 
been proportionally more cases of divided government since 1945, combined with Congress’ 
tendency to produce more legislation over time, means that not accounting for the systematic 
differences in eras would lead us to potentially underestimate the effect of unified government 
for the full time period.  
Examining the models in Table 3 more closely, we note that the effect is robust to several 
different specifications. When we look at the effect of unified government only within the same 
Presidential administration, we still estimate an effect of 3 additional significant acts. Similarly, 
when we use decade fixed effects—designed to control for any variation in data on significant 
legislation was gathered from decade to decade—the effect also remains stable at 3 additional 
acts under unified government.  
We also re-estimate the results using a polynomial time trend rather than era dummy 
variables. Table C2 in the Appendix presents these results. Using a time trend rather than era 
dummy variables does not substantively alter our finding on the effects of unified/divided 
government. Our estimates using this alternative specification find that unified government is 
still associated with approximately 2 to 3 additional significant acts depending on the 
specification.  
As another way to counter the time trends in the data, we take first differences. We 
examine the change in significant legislation from one Congress to the next as a function of 
changes in partisan control. After first differencing, the outcome variable (the change in 
legislation from one Congress to the next) appears to follow a stationary process with a mean of 
zero and constant variance over time.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Our findings provide further support for the notion that unified partisan control is 
associated with increased output of significant legislation. In Panel A of Table 4 we estimate that 
a change to unified government yields an increase of 3 significant acts. When including a lagged 
term, under the theory that momentum from previous years might influence legislative output, 
our results remain unchanged.  In addition, the effect sizes are substantively large, as the share of 
significant acts increases by roughly one-third.10 To place the result in context, consider that 
Congress has changed from divided to unified control or vice versa 42 times (21 times from 
divided to unified and 21 times from unified to divided) and that each change is associated with a 
gain or loss of between 3 and 4 pieces of significant legislation. All told the estimates suggest 
that Congress’ legislative record might be markedly different were there substantially more years 
of uninterrupted divided or unified control. Finally, in contrast to the large effect on significant 
legislation, we find that changes in party control have no effect on changes in total legislation.  
Examining the estimated effects era by era illustrates that the effects of a change from 
divided to unified government has not been constant over time. Panel B in Table 4 re-estimates 
the model using only sessions of Congress from before 1900. Unified control in this era was 
associated with between 1 and 2 additional pieces of legislation. On the other hand, we observe a 
larger and more robust effect for 1900 and after. Panel C in Table 4 reveals that changes to 
unified government coincided with an uptick in legislative productivity of 4 bills for Congresses 
that convened in 1900 and after.  
Part of the explanation may be that Congress as a whole has done more after 1900— 
Congress averaged 200 public acts before 1900 and over 620 public acts since. Indeed, Panels B 
																																																						
10 Panel A of Table C3 in the Appendix shows effect sizes when the dependent variable is log-
transformed. Thus, the coefficient for the unified government variable gives the percentage 
change in significant legislation attributable to a shift. 
and C of Table C3 in the Appendix confirm that on a percentage basis the effect of unified 
government before 1900 is not significantly different from the effect after 1900. Both estimates 
hover around 30% depending on the specification. Thus, if we take into account the upward 
trend in the number of public acts and significant legislation over time, the effect of unified 
government on its own does not appear to have changed drastically over time.11 
Examining the full history of Congress, we find that changes in party control have a 
sizeable effect on the passage of significant legislation; however, we find no such pattern for the 
passage of total legislation. These contrasting results underscore the value of studying significant 
legislation, as opposed to all legislation. Congress passes many symbolic acts, including naming 
post offices, issuing proclamations to recognize causes or groups, or passing resolutions that lack 
force of law but expresses concerns. Most of these inconsequential bills are not controversial, 
and the roll call votes often near-unanimous and nonpartisan. When Congress engage with a 
substantial change in the national law and policy, we see the effects of partisan politics in clearer 
relief. Thus, a change in government from divided to unified partisan control is associated with a 
30 to 40 percent increase in the number of significant laws passed. While the level effect has 
grown in line with the upward trend in legislation, the effect as a share of significant legislation 
has remained stable over time.  
Given that eras of unified government coincide with increased legislative productivity, 
the next step is to ask (1) what mechanisms best account for the observed upticks in productivity 
under unified control; and, (2) are there alternative explanations that account for the observed 
increases in legislative productivity. The span of congressional history has seen much other 
																																																						
11 One exception: it appears changes to unified government may indeed have coincided with 
greater output of total legislation in the era before 1900. 
significant institutional variation. The introduction of the cloture rule, changes in the use of the 
filibuster, changes in the concentration of power in party leadership in the House, and changes in 
the strength of political parties (to name just a few) all likely have some influence on legislative 
productivity.  
In fact, some of these factors might be “necessary conditions” that work in tandem with 
unified government to boost legislative productivity. To determine whether this is the case, we 
examine the relationship between legislative productivity and several additional variables: an 
indicator for a supermajority in the Senate, the size of the budget deficit as a share of federal 
outlays, time since the President’s party last held unified control, time since the party opposing 
the President last held unified control, and time since the last instance of divided control. Our 
goal is to see whether these issues interact meaningfully with the link we observed between 
unified partisan control and legislative productivity. If not, then the simplest possible 
explanation—having a majority across both chambers of Congress—sufficiently explains 
variation in productivity during moments of unified control. 
In our main specifications, we have focused on Mayhew's conjecture that divided partisan 
control of government affects the amount of significant legislation passed by Congress. Krehbiel 
(1998; 2006) offers a further claim that the location of the filibuster pivot (i.e., the Senator whose 
vote would prove pivotal in ending a filibuster) helps determine the ability of Congress to pass 
significant legislation. Specifically, Krehbiel argues that a “gridlock” zone exists in the area 
between the filibuster pivot and the veto override pivot. When the status quo policy falls between 
these two points, Congress will struggle to pass legislation since both the President and filibuster 
pivot will block any legislation moving away from their ideal points.  
We account for the filibuster pivot by tracking when a party held a filibuster-proof 
majority. Other researchers (e.g., Gray and Jenkins 2016) have found weak support for the 
filibuster pivot argument, especially compared to the divided government argument. When there 
is unified control across all branches of government, a filibuster in the Senate might nonetheless 
lead to gridlock. For example, in the first two years of the Clinton Administration, a minority 
group of Senate Republicans employed the filibuster to prevent passage of a broad range of bills 
including health care reform, campaign finance reform, and limits on lobbying. Though the 
Democrats held control of the presidency, House and Senate, passage of several pieces of 
significant legislation was obstructed by filibuster. If the Democrats had held a filibuster proof 
majority (more than two-thirds since 1917 and more than three-fifths since 1975), they could 
have been more productive. 
To test the degree to which a supermajority makes a difference for legislative 
productivity, we estimate a model that includes indicator variables for unified government, a 
supermajority, and, finally, the interaction between the two. A coefficient with positive sign for 
the interaction term would suggest that Congresses in which there was unified party control and 
a Senate supermajority coincide with increased legislative productivity. Specification 4 in Table 
C4 in the Appendix coincides with our expectations. We observe a positive effect for the 
interaction term between unified control and supermajorities when significant legislation is the 
outcome variable. The marginal effect of unified government on its own (without the interaction 
term) is also still positive, though its 95% confidence intervals does now include zero. In 
combination, this suggests that the effect of unified government might be amplified in 
Congresses that coincide with a Senate supermajority, but that even without a supermajority 
there is still substantial positive effects of unified government on legislative productivity. 
Specification 3 provides weaker evidence in support of the notion that supermajorities are 
important. When we do not include period dummy variables, all coefficients’ 95% confidence 
intervals overlap with zero. One reason is that any test of theories involving supermajorities must 
rely on a reduced sample size—from 1917 onwards—after adoption of the cloture rule. 
Budgetary issues could serve as another way in which institutional constraints shape the 
effects of unified government on legislative productivity. If the government has run a large 
deficit in the previous Congress, pressure to balance the budget might reduce possibilities for 
significant action. Table C5 demonstrates that this explanation does not carry much weight. In 
fact, in moments where a higher deficit (in terms of percent of federal outlays) has coincided 
with unified government, Congress has been more likely to pass significant legislation. This 
account is consistent with the notion that periods of spending with less regard for short term 
deficits are associated with higher legislative productivity (i.e., Congresses during the New Deal 
and Great Society).12 
Long stretches of opposition party control or of divided government might influence 
subsequent levels of legislative productivity during periods of unified control. Specifically, a 
unified Congress and President might have less to do if they held unified control very recently; 
on the other hand, a long stretch of divided control or of the opposition party holding unified 
control might elicit a wave of legislation designed to make up for past gridlock (divided control) 
or to undo previous legislation (unified opposition control). Table C6 in the Appendix presents 
the results from this model. With the caveat that focusing on unified government only has 
reduced our sample size, we find no evidence that who controlled Congress previously makes a 
difference during periods of unified control. 
																																																						
12 We estimated the effects since 1901 as these were the years for which yearly budget deficit 
data was available. 
Based on this array of evidence, it appears that unified partisan control on its own is 
generally sufficient for increased legislative productivity, though also having a filibuster-proof 
majority helps. Our second concern is that explanations other than unified government better 
explain the observed increases in legislative productivity. For instance, if certain institutional 
changes correlate with both divided government and legislative productivity, then these omitted 
factors—rather than divided partisan control of government—could be more crucial for 
determining legislative productivity.  
Here, we examine two possibilities. First, what role does the length of the legislative 
session play? If the number of days in session correlates with divided government, and we do not 
control for session length, then we might incorrectly attribute increased productivity to unified 
control of government. In practice, it appears that days in session has increased almost linearly 
over time. When we include a variable measuring days in session, our central results do not 
change. Table C7 (Specifications 1 and 4) illustrate this point. On its own, days in session is not 
predictive of any change in legislative productivity. Furthermore, including it in a specification 
with an indicator for unified government does not meaningfully change our previous estimates.  
Second, does accounting for variation in the centralization of power in House and Senate 
leadership change our conclusions in any way? For instance, between 1890 and 1910, power was 
so centralized in the Speaker of the House that he was often referred to as a czar (Galloway and 
Wise 1975) and controlled committee appointments, the Rules Committee, and recognition of 
motions for unanimous consent and suspension of the rules (Cooper and Brady 1981). Cooper 
and Brady (1981) makes the case that party strength (measured, for example, through the share 
of party-line votes) was a key ingredient to enabling a centralized party leadership. The effect 
this might have on legislative productivity is ambiguous. On the one hand, Cooper and Brady 
(1981) makes the case that leaders with centralized powers were more likely to be “task or goal-
oriented,” but also less likely to reach consensus and negotiate. Furthermore, one of the key 
complaints that precipitated the revolt against Speaker Joseph Cannon was against his tendency 
towards the status quo in the face of rising demand for progressive reforms. Whatever the case, if 
unified party government tended to occur in tandem with strong parties and centralized 
leadership (and these affected legislative productivity), then our primary estimates might suffer 
from important omitted variable bias. 
We test whether including measures of leadership centralization in the House and the 
Senate attenuates our estimates of the effect of unified government on significant legislation. To 
measure centralization of leadership, we employ a coding scheme developed in Brady, Cooper, 
and Hurley (1979) and extended in Aldrich, Berger, and Rhode (1999) that covers Congresses 
from the late 19th century onwards. In Table C7, we include a specification that includes a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one in cases when both the House and Senate are coded to 
have had centralized leadership under the coding scheme. The coefficient on this variable is 
negative and its 95% confidence intervals do not overlap with zero, suggesting a decrease in 
legislative productivity under centralized leadership. However, including this additional variable 
does not meaningfully attenuate the coefficient on our primary variable of interest: we continue 
to observe that unified government coincided with increases in roughly four bills per Congress. 
When we use a slightly different measure of centralization (including separate variables for the 
House and the Senate, along with an indicator for a strong party caucus in the House), our 
primary estimate stays the same. 
Another possible concern about our analysis is that the results are dependent on our 
particular approach to collecting and identifying significant legislation. To reduce this concern, 
we replicated our analysis using counts of major legislation from Stathis (2014). Appendix A 
presents these results. In Table A1 we replicate the analysis of the effect of unified government 
on significant legislation (Table 2). When we include data from all congresses, the coefficients 
are all positive, but the results are only statistically significant in one of the four model 
specifications. However, when we subset the data to only include our first three time periods 
from the 1st to 79th Congresses, the results are significant across all specifications. As shown in 
Figure 2, our data differs more from Stathis’ data in the later congresses; Stathis finds more bills 
to be significant. The difference in results is thus attributable to the coding of recent legislation. 
In Table A2, we replicate the analyses in Tables 4, 5, and 6, where we measure the relationship 
between a change in unified government and a change in significant legislation. We find a 
statistically significant effect for all congresses and for the 1st–55th Congresses period, but the 
results for the 56th–111th Congresses alone are not significant. Overall, the models with the 
Stathis data confirm our findings, and show that when the full legislative output of Congress is 
studied, there is a positive effect of unified government on productivity. While we see 
differences in the effect of unified government in legislative productivity for the post-war period, 
this matches the literature, where the result is dependent upon the coding of significant 
legislation.  
5 Conclusion  
Today it seems taken as axiomatic that the political parties in the United States have 
created a dysfunctional legislative process that is incapable of passing legislation, let alone 
legislation of any significance. This line of thinking, taken as a broad argument about American 
government, would predict that when government is divided and when parties are polarized 
ideologically, little can get done. This analysis puts the current Congresses in historical context 
and shows Congress to be more productive than popular accounts would have the public believe. 
Our assessment is that there is definitely an effect of divided partisan control of government on 
the likelihood that Congress passes significant legislation. Congress passes about 30 percent 
more significant acts when the House, the Senate, or the Presidency are controlled by the same 
party than it does when different parties control the branches of government. Interestingly, that is 
not the case for all bills, only significant legislation. However, this finding does not mean 
divided government is completely dysfunctional. Instead of passing 12 significant laws, which is 
the average for unified government in the 20th Century, a divided government typically passes 9 
significant laws. Even in a Congress that many observers described as the most dysfunctional 
ever, the House and Senate managed to hammer out a complete rewriting of the U. S. Patent 
Law, redefining what is patentable in the country.  
The importance of party control comes into sharper focus once we take a long historical 
perspective, but so too do the limits of party-based arguments about law-making. In particular, 
party control of government cannot explain most of the variation in what Congress has done 
throughout U. S. history. Party control cannot explain why there is much more legislation and 
much more significant legislation in the 20th Century than in the 19th Century. Nor can party 
control explain the surge in significant legislation and overall legislation from the 1930s to the 
1960s and the ebb in significant legislation since. It cannot explain why the 1960s are so much 
more productive than the 1930s or the 1890s. It cannot explain why unified party control during 
the 19th Century is less productive than divided party control in the 20th and 21st Centuries. It 
cannot explain the legislative accomplishments of Congress during the Nixon years, compared to 
more recent spells of unified government under Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack 
Obama. And it cannot explain the steady downward trend in legislative productivity in the US 
since 1970, a trend that all Congresses — whether during unified or divided government — seem 
incapable of escaping.  
A closer look at the data make even clearer the inadequacy of party control of 
government as an explanation for the broad trends in legislative activity throughout the history of 
Congress. First, unified control of government occurred more often during the first 110 years of 
Congress (65 percent of Congresses were unified) than for the next 115 years of Congress (61 
percent). Second, unified party control, without including any other factors in the regressions, 
explains a tiny percent of the total variation. When we model the data using just party control of 
government, the R-Squared is less than 1 percent. Third, when the models include simple time 
trends (four eras of Congressional history), most of the variation in the data is explained. Fourth, 
indicators of Presidencies account for another 20 to 30 percent of the variability. Who is 
president, then, may be much more important than whether control of government is unified in 
the hands of one party or divided between them. We offer no causal or theoretical account for 
these eras, except to note that they explain 40 to 70 percent of the systematic variation and are 
far more important than party, a finding consistent with Peterson’s Legislating Together. Why 
might that be the case? We leave that question unanswered – a challenge for future theorizing 
and empirical investigation. The study of Congress and legislation is usually inward looking, 
focused on the institution itself. The importance of the individual president (rather than the party 
of the president) in explaining the variation in legislative productivity suggest that forces outside 
the institution itself are essential to understanding what Congress does and when it does it.  
The data marshaled here have helped us to put the party explanations of legislation in a 
broader historical perspective. They both provide evidence of an effect of party control on law-
making and expose the limitations of that line of explanation. Several broad historical patterns 
cry out for explanation and cannot be accounted for by the usual party-control of government 
account. In particular, why did the demand for national legislation begin to grow in the second 
half of the 20th Century? The American Congress since 1945, or perhaps 1932, appears to be a 
fundamentally different institution in terms of significant legislation passed, than the institution 
that existed before the middle of the 20th Century. There was a profound change in the 1930s, or 
perhaps the 1940s, in what people seem to demand from national government, and even during 
the years of New Federalism and deconstruction of the Great Society and New Deal, the amount 
of significant legislation enacted by Congress has far exceeded what came before the 1920s. 
Perhaps that puzzle may be waved away by noting that life is just more complicated now, but 
that only begs the question (or perhaps the explanation). Is it the case, then, that Congress does 
what it does and when it does it not because of political polarization, party control, or other 
internal and institutional accounts, but because Congress responds to the needs of an increasingly 
complex nation? That is, Congress does what it does, as Arthur Maass argued three decades ago 
and James Madison argued two centuries ago, because it acts in the Common Good.  
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Data Collection Procedure and Sources  
The data was assembled using a team of student coders. To ensure reliability in 
assembling the database, each decade was assigned to multiple coders. We anticipated some 
decades would be especially difficult, such as the 1930s or 1960s, so we assigned additional 
coders to those decades. Creating a database in this way is a complex task, as coders could 
approach their decades differently. We worked with the coders to standardize coding methods 
and databases across decades. We developed a common template, agreed on a common 
definition of “significant legislation” (which we describe in the body of this paper), and collected 
data from the same set of initial sources. The key variables in the database template are bill 
names, descriptions, categories, outcomes, and roll call votes and dates. We also asked coders to 
collect information on committees and primary sponsors in each chamber when the data was 
available.  
The use of common sources across time periods simplified the process of determining 
significance, as the authors of these works had already decided what bills they thought were 
important based on their own criteria. While these criteria may not match ours perfectly, they at 
least provided consistency across time periods. For legislation from 1789 through 1945, coders 
began with the bills listed in Castel and Gibson’s (1975) The Yeas and the Nays: Key 
Congressional Decisions, 1774-1945. Castel and Gibson identified key legislation from each 
Congress and provided descriptions and vote totals for each. The American Political Science 
Review between 1910 and 1940 occasionally presented summaries of significant Congressional 
action during the term. For the 1950s through 2010s, coders began with the CQ Almanac for 
each year, and recorded all of the bills listed in the key votes section of each almanac. The 1940s 
were a particular challenge, as our key sources either ended in the 1940s or began in the 1950s. 
As a result, the coders working on the 1940s used a variety of sources, including The Yeas and 
the Nays, Mayhew’s database on congressional actions, and Charles Cameron’s database on 
major legislation. The coders supplemented these books with a variety of other sources that the 
librarians at Harvard University helped us to identify. Additional sources included histories of 
Congress, online resources from the Library of Congress, and the Congressional Record (and its 
antecedents). Galloway and Wise’s History of the House of Representatives and Josephy’s The 
American Heritage History of the Congress of the United States were particularly useful for 
many coders. Galloway also included many useful figures in appendices, including counts of 
total public and private legislation in each Congress. Coders collecting data from the 101st 
Congress through the present used The Library of Congress: THOMAS. The Library of 
Congress’ site A Century of Lawmaking For a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and 
Debates 1774–1875 was also very helpful for collecting information on the first fifty Congresses. 
Coders looking for more detail on particular bills used the Congressional Record to collect 
information and understand the debates surrounding major bills. We spent substantial time 
working with the Congressional Record (as well as the Annals of Congress, Register of Debates, 
and Congressional Globe). The websites for the House, Senate, National Archives, and 
govtrack.us were also useful. We encouraged all of the coders to make a pass through the 
Congressional Record for their given decade. They were asked to find the laws identified by CQ 
Almanac or Yeas and Nays or other sources as significant legislation in the Congressional 
Record. They were also asked to identify subjects on which there was much debate or activity in 
the index of the Record. The next step in assembling the database was to compile the individual 
databases from each coder into one comprehensive database and review the coders’ work for 
consistency. We reviewed the database to remove duplicate entries (some decades were assigned 
to more than one coder) and any legislation that did not meet our significance criteria or was 
missing critical information. We then used keywords in the coders’ categories and descriptions to 
categorize the bills into 46 categories. We also included counts of total public and private bills 
passed in each Congress. For the Congresses between 1789 and 1976 we used Appendix F of 
Galloway and Wise (1976), and for the remaining years we used counts from the Library of 
Congress.  
 
Key Sources:  
• The Yeas and the Nays: Key Congressional Decisions, 1774-1945 by Albert Castel and 
Scott L. Gibson (1975).  
• The American Political Science Review: between 1910 and 1940 occasionally presented 
summaries of significant Congressional action during the term.  
• Congressional Quarterly Almanacs: 1948–2010.  
• History of the House of Representatives, by George B. Galloway and Sidney Wise 
(1976). Includes counts of total public and private legislation in each Congress.  
• The American Heritage History of the Congress of the United States by Alvin M. Josephy 
(1975).  
• The Library of Congress 
o “A Century of Lawmaking For a New Nation.” 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lawhome.html. 
o THOMAS. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php.  
Tables 
Table 1: Mean Legislative Output per Congress 
Party Control Total Legislation Significant 
Legislation 
Obs. 
Divided 414.16 8.12 43 
















Table 2: Mean Legislative Output per Congress, by Era  
Era of Congress Party Control Total Leg. Significant Leg. Obs. 
1st-36th Divided 116.00 5.00 11 
1st-36th Unified 120.72 5.64 25 
37th-55th Divided 312.30 4.40 10 
37th-55th Unified 395.22 7.00 9 
56th-79th Divided 412.25 6.50 4 
56th-79th Unified 634.20 7.05 20 
80th-111th Divided 653.39 12.44 18 












Table 3: Divided/Unified Government and Legislative Output 
 Total Legislation Significant Legislation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Unified 
Government 
-13.28 41.06 20.22 24.98 0.34 2.41** 3.06** 2.96*** 
 (51.70) (27.49) (31.00) (22.99) (1.19) (1.05) (1.34) (0.88) 
37th-55th 
Congress 
 242.51*** 148.50*** 453.03***  0.79 -2.50 7.11** 
  (21.61) (7.85) (91.84)  (1.05) (3.23) (3.43) 
56th-79th 
Congress 
 473.37*** 82.50*** 442.04***  1.25 -1.50 6.88** 
  (41.88) (7.85) (89.43)  (1.34) (3.23) (3.35) 
80th-111th 
Congress 
 533.35*** 161.91 650.20***  9.87*** -5.81 9.19*** 
  (33.77) (119.51) (47.41)  (1.38) (3.62) (2.13) 
President 
FEs  
No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Decade FEs  No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
R-squared 0.001 0.723 0.912 0.891 0.001 0.417 0.730 0.719 




Table 4: Changes in Unified Government and Legislative Output 
 D Total Legislation D Significant Legislation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: All Congresses 
Change to 
Unified Gov 
29.95*   26.88 29.64 3.02* 2.48* 3.04* 
                 (17.67) (19.08) (18.20) (0.92) (0.90) (0.92) 
Observations     110 109 110 110 109 110 
R-squared 0.022 0.045 0.029 0.103 0.245 0.105 
Panel B: 1st--55th Congress 
Change to 
Unified Gov 
44.63* 43.79* 44.12* 1.75*   1.33 1.77*   
                 (13.32) (14.13) (13.80) (1.03) (0.93) (1.02) 
Observations     54 53 54 54 53 54 
R-squared 0.166 0.17 0.172 0.063 0.248 0.066 
Panel C: 56th--111th Congress 
Change to 
Unified Gov 
10.39 5.3 10.39 4.72* 4.01*  4.72* 
                 (36.96) (40.54) (37.87) (1.58) (1.63) (1.58) 
Observations     56 56 56 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.001 0.031 0.007 0.157 0.273 0.158 
Lagged DV        No          Yes          No          No          Yes          No          
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
Analysis Using Stathis Data  
The tables below replicate our primary analysis using counts of total legislation from 
Stathis (2014).  
Table A1: Significant Legislation in Divided/Unified Government 
 All Congresses 1st-79th Congresses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Unified Gov -1.22 1.47 1.82 2.24** 3.21*** 3.13*** 2.29 3.58*** 
 (1.57) (0.96) (1.25) (0.91) (0.99) (0.93) (1.48) (0.96) 
37th-55th 
Congress 
 2.97** 6.50 1.31  3.38*** 6.50 -4.17** 
  (1.15) (4.16) (3.88)  (1.08) (4.22) (1.68) 
56th-79th 
Congress 
 4.89*** 2.50 2.69  4.71*** 2.50 -3.46 
  (1.29) (4.16) (3.45)  (1.30) (4.22) (2.23) 
80th-111th 
Congress 
 14.74*** 3.77 6.65**     
  (1.24) (4.90) (3.14)     
Pres. FEs  No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Decade FEs  No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 111 111 111 111 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.006 0.600 0.806 0.808 0.088 0.268 0.579 0.631 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
 p<0.10, p<0.05, p<0.01  
 
Table A2: ∆ Significant Legislation 
 All Congresses 1st-55th Cong. 56th-111th Cong. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
D Unified 
Gov. 
3.14*** 2.47*** 3.13*** 3.96*** 3.36*** 3.94*** 2.06 1.44 2.06 
 (0.85) (0.85) (0.85) (0.79) (0.78) (0.77) (1.66) (1.63) (1.67) 
Lagged 
DV  




No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Obs. 110 109 110 54 53 54 56 56 56 
R-
squared 
0.107 0.345 0.108 0.252 0.430 0.254 0.032 0.319 0.032 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 





Robustness Checks  
Table C1: Divided/Unified Government and log(Legislative Output) 
 log(Total Legislation) log(Significant Legislation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Unified 
Government 
-0.10 0.10* 0.05 0.09* -0.04 0.18 0.38** 0.31*** 
 (0.15) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) 
37th-55th 
Congress 
 1.11*** 0.61*** 1.81***  0.11 -0.63 0.14 
  (0.07) (0.02) (0.14)  (0.18) (0.69) (0.29) 
56th-79th 
Congress 
 1.58*** 0.45*** 1.77***  0.17 -0.53 0.13 
  (0.09) (0.02) (0.13)  (0.19) (0.69) (0.29) 
80th-111th 
Congress 
 1.71*** 0.54*** 2.07***  1.05*** -0.89 0.46*** 
  (0.07) (0.17) (0.06)  (0.14) (0.72) (0.08) 
President 
FEs  
No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Decade FEs  No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
R-squared 0.004 0.863 0.954 0.935 0.001 0.342 0.697 0.629 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
 p<0.10, p<0.05, p<0.01 
We transformed the outcome variable for log(Significant Legislation) by adding one to address 
the one instance where a Congress produced no significant legislation.  
Table C2: Divided/Unified Government and Legislative Output with 
Time Trend 
 Total Legislation Significant Legislation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Unified 
Government 
-13.28 75.50** 24.50 24.58 0.34 1.83* 2.30* 2.90*** 
 (51.70) (31.93) (35.98) (22.16) (1.19) (1.00) (1.35) (0.86) 
Time Trend 
(Polynomial)  
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
President 
FEs  
No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Decade FEs  No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
R-squared 0.001 0.676 0.913 0.893 0.001 0.363 0.744 0.722 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 









Table C3: Changes in Unified Government and log(Legislative Output) 
 D log(Total Legislation) D log(Significant Legislation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: All Congresses 
Change to 
Unified Gov 
0.11   0.08 0.10 0.34 0.22 0.34 
                 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Observations     110 109 110 110 109 110 
R-squared 0.041 0.127 0.048 0.077 0.248 0.078 
Panel B: 1st--55th Congress 
Change to 
Unified Gov 
0.16 0.13 0.16 0.29   0.16 0.30   
                 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) 
Observations     54 53 54 54 53 54 
R-squared 0.086 0.190 0.089 0.055 0.271 0.056 
Panel C: 56th--111th Congress 
Change to 
Unified Gov 
0.03 0.02 0.03 0.40 0.30  0.40 
                 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
Observations     56 56 56 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.001 0.031 0.007 0.157 0.273 0.158 
Lagged DV        No          Yes          No          No          Yes          No          
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
Table C4: Divided/Unified Government, Senate Supermajorities and 
Legislative Output, 1917-2010 
 Total Legislation Significant Legislation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unified 
Government 
39.84 36.73 0.11 2.27 
 (65.26) (69.12) (2.11) (1.98) 
Senate 
Supermajority 
85.32 87.18 -2.50 -3.80* 




50.87 47.23 7.39 9.93** 
 (108.14) (110.70) (4.47) (3.69) 
56th-79th 
Congress 
 11.82  -8.21*** 
  (64.64)  (2.12) 
Observations 47 47 47 47 
R-squared 0.098 0.099 0.076 0.350 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 





Table C5: Divided/Unified Government, the Budget Deficit and 
Legislative Output, 1901- 2010 
 Total Legislation Significant Legislation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unified 
Government 
39.11 54.57 -0.80 2.70 
 (67.02) (65.79) (2.03) (2.02) 
Deficit 
(Lagged) 
-19.76 -15.75 -2.74 -1.83 





-49.70 -39.70 10.75 13.01** 
 (309.10) (290.42) (9.53) (5.12) 
80th-111th 
Congress 
 42.76  9.68*** 
  (58.91)  (1.80) 
Observations 54 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.013 0.023 0.049 0.427 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 




 Table C6: Determinants of Productivity Under Unified Government 
 Total Legislation Significant Legislation 





-28.27 -36.62 1.79 0.65 






17.41 15.37 1.04 -0.52 




-63.79 6.91 -1.35 0.16 
 (60.30) (28.58) (1.20) (0.82) 
Time Period 
Controls  
No Yes No Yes 
Observations 62 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.022 0.731 0.106 0.526 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 







Table C7: Divided/Unified Government, Days in Session, 
Centralization, and Legislative Output 
 Total Legislation Significant Legislation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Unified Government 39.95 62.28 51.64 2.44** 3.75** 4.33*** 
 (27.11) (42.44) (42.69) (1.03) (1.67) (1.53) 
Days in Session -0.15   0.00   
 (0.19)   (0.00)   
House & Senate 
Leadership 
Centralization 
 -216.10***   -3.78***  
  (43.33)   (1.40)  
House Leadership 
Centralization 
  -149.07**   -6.79*** 
   (60.19)   (1.74) 
House Strong Party 
Caucus 
  -115.43*   -0.49 
   (62.29)   (2.24) 
Senate Leadership 
Centralization 
  -22.45   4.37** 
   (73.15)   (2.10) 
Time Period FEs  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 111 60 60 111 60 60 
R-squared 0.726 0.334 0.428 0.422 0.408 0.471 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; Data on Centralization covers 52nd Congress onward. 











(a) This figure displays our measure of significant legislation in comparison to Mayhew (1991) 
and Howell et al. (2000). Our measure correlates with Mayhew at 0.6855 and with Howell et al. 
at 0.6287. 
 (b) This figure displays our measure of significant legislation in comparison to Stathis (2014). 
Looking back across all past congresses, our measure of significant legislation correlates with 











Figure 2: Acts/Significant Acts of Congress 
 
 
(a) This figure displays the total number of public acts plotted over time. 
 





 (c) This figure displays the percent of all public acts that are significant. 
